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in whom rests the full and final power, ordain otherwise
by express constitutional amendment.
As to this particular case" regardless of the right purportedly given petitioner by the provisions of section 12 (b)
of ,the California Real Estate Act (Deering's Gen. Laws
(1937), Act 112, p. 30, at p. 40) to seek a review pursuant
to the provisions of Chapter I of Title 1 of Part III of the
Code of Civil Procedure (certiorari) and. whether or not
~uch type of review could be lawfully ordained by the Legislature (see Standard Oil 00. v. State Board of Equal. (1936),
sUpra,6 Ca1.2d 557 [59 P.2d 119]), he also had the right (available to all persons) to petition for the remedy of his own
choosing (mandamus). Whether his petition stated facts
entitling him to that remedy was a question of law and of
judicial discretion depending on the substance of the facts
stated; it was a question which would not be concluded by
the mere existence of a possible alternative equitable procedure (see Sheehan v. Board of Police Oommrs. (1920), 47
Cal.App. 29, 36 [190 P. 51] ; Great Western Power 00. v.
Pillsbury (1915), 170 Cal. 180, 182-183 [149 P. 35]). The
discretion of the trial court is not shown to have been
abused.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[L. A. No. 18581.

In Bank.

May 3, 1943.) ,

SECURITY-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOS ANGELES (a National Banking Association), Respondent, v.
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST & SAV~
INGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking Association), Appellant.
'
[1] Negotiable Instruments-Form and Requisites-Payability to
, Bearer-'-Fictitious Payee-Existent Person.-The fact that

,[1] When negotiable instruments deemed payable to fictitious
persons within statute that makes paper payable to bearer, note
18 A.L.R. 15. See, also, 19 Ca1.Jur. 819; 7 Am.Jur. 840.
'Mc~. Dig. Ref'lrences: [1,4] Negotiable Instruments, § 13; [2]
~egotlable Instruments, § 41; Banks, § 107; [3] Negotiable Instruments, § 159; [5, 6J Negotiable Instruments § 17' [7J Banks
§ 168.
"
,

[5]

[6]

checks are drawn to an actual person does not preve~t his
name from being that of a fictitious payee, where it IS not
intended that he should have an interest therein. Such ,,11;
check, however, is not payable to bearer unless the ~act .that
the payee is fictitious is known "by the person makmg It so
payable." (See Civ. Code, § 3090, subd. 3.)
Id.-Derenses-Forgery: Banks-Payment on Forged Indorsement.-A forged indorsement is ordinarily a nullity. It ,does
not pass title to a check, and a ba~k may not ~harge to the
account of its depositor a check paId on the baSIS of such, an
indorsement. A drawer, however, who intentionally makes, a
check payable to a fictitious payee, cannot obtain the benefit
of these rules, as he knows that the check will be indorsed
in the name of the payee by someone bea:ing another n~~e.,
When the drawer entrusts an employee WIth the responsIbility of signing checks, the signer takes the place of the
drawer and his knowledge binds the drawer.
,
Id.~Checks--Rights and LlabilitleS-Fraudof Bookkeeper.Where the drawer of a check or his signer is the victim of the
fraud of the bookkeeper who is charged ,with examining the
drawer's accounts and informing him of his liabilities, the
person buying or paying the check has no right to a r~l~a~e,
at the expense of the innocent drawer, from the responsIbility
of determining the authenticity of the indorsements.
','
Id.-Form and Requisites-Payability toBearer';';':'FictitiO~
Payee-Knowledge of Employee.-Fictitious payee checks are:
not payable to bearer unless the signer is aware ~f the fra~d.
This is true even though a bank officer"authorlZed to SIgJ1;
checks signs them in reliance on vouchers of another, employee,
whose fraud in preparing the vouchers automa~i?ally)ed ,to
the officer's unwitting execution of checks to fictItIouS payees.
Id.-Form and Requisites-Execution"':'Deli~ery.~Deli:very: of
a negotiable instrument is not essential' to its exe,cu.tion~~\
check is complete when received by the person W;ho IS t(), d~
liver it, and lack of delivery is no defenseagaitlst a hold,er,
in due course. (See Civ. Code, § 3097.)
" , ',
Id.":"'Form and Requisites-Execution-Delivery-Check Pa.y-,
able to Fictitious Payee.-Ordinarily the signer remains the

[3lWho must bear loss as between drawer ~who deliverschec'k:,
to an impostor and one who cashes or pays It upon the lattersindorsement, note, 22 A.L.R. 1228. See, also, 8 Am.Jur. 314.."
,'
[4] Intent and knowledge of employee or agent of person: sought.
to be charged as affecting application as to latter rule, that D,e~
gotiable paper payable to fictitious, person is payable, to bearer,
note, 74 A.L.R. 822. See, also, 7 Am.Jur. 844.
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person making a completed check payable to a fictitious payee,
regardless of whether another employee is responsible for seeing that it reaches the payee.
[7] Banks-Collections-Clearing Houses.-A clearing house
transaction in which checks presented are charged to the bank
on which they are drawn is usually tentative oJ;lly, and the
cleared checks are not regarded as paid until the time has
passed under the clearing house rules during which the drawee
bank can return them to the forwarding bank.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. A. L. Pierovich, Judge assigned. Affirmed.
. ActioJ? against bank honoring checks on forged indorsement
to recover on bank's guaranty of prior indorsements. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Louis Ferrari, Edmund Nelson and G. L. Berrey for Appellant.

.T.t
:. !

,I
• :1

Jennings & Belcher for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The plaintiff, Security-First National
Bank, issues numerous checks drawn on itself. It was the sole
duty of one of plaintiff's officers, A. M. Hadley, to sign such
chec~s. Ea~h check was presented to him with a debit slip,
and if the slIp showed that the check was properly authorized
and that funds were available in the proper account, he
si~ed the check. Among the employees who prepared debit
slIps and wrote checks, but who were not authorized to sign
checks, was Dee L. Ellis, Jr., head of the accounting division
of the trust department. Ellis prepared a number of checks
for Hadley's signature, drawn to the order of L. W. Bobbitt
together with debit slips in the usual form on the basis of
which Hadley signed the checks. There was such a person
as Bobbitt, but he knew nothing of the transaction and Ellis
did not intend that he receive any of the checks.' Ellis had
become acquainted with one of defendant's employees and
had no difficulty in establishing an account with defendant
as agent for Bobbitt. He indorsed the name of L. W. Bobbitt
On the checks, deposited them in this account, and later withdrew the funds deposited. Defendant presented the checks
through the Los Angeles clearing house and in accord with
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' ..

the cl~aring house rules guaranteed all prio~ ind?rsenieri~:
When plaintiff received the checks from the. cl~anng honse,
they were returned to the accounting division o~ the trust
department where they fell into the hands of Ell1~,. who de~
stroyed them. By manipulation of the out~tandmg~~hecks
file Ellis was able to conceal the fraud for a tlIl;e, b~t It. was
eventually discovered, and plaintiff b::ought thiS s~t on defendant's guarantee. Defendant appeals from the Judgment
for plaintiff.
.
C'ViI C d
[1] Defendant invokes section 3090 of the. 1
0 e
(§ 9(3) of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act) providing: "The instrument is payabl: .to bearer .•••(3) .When
it is payable to the order of a fictItIous or no~-exl~tent person, and .such fact is known to the person ma~g. It so paybl
" I f these checks are payable to a fictItIous payee,
therefore bearer paper,
guarantee of the
indorsements imposes no liability. (Unwn B. & T. 00. v.
Security-First Nat. Bank, 8 CaL2d 303 [65 P.2d 3551.) ~e
fact that Bobbitt was an actual person does ~o~ prevent hiS
name from being that of a fictitious payee, fo~ 1~ IS settled ~h~t
an instrument is drawn to the order of a fictItIous payee If .It
is
intended that the person named on its ~ace ~ave any
interest in it. (Union B. & T. 00. v. Securdy-Ftrst Nat.
Bank supra.) Such a check, however, is not payable to bearer uniess the fact that the payee is fictitious is known by "the
person making it so payable." (Civ. Code, § .3090.)
..
.. [2] This condition limits the extent to w~lch the fiCtItlOuS
payee rule qualifies the usual rules governm~ the .effe~tof
f.orged indorsements. A forged indorsemen~. IS ordm,arily a
nullity. It does not pass title to a check (C1V. C~de, § 3104;

:n;'a'r~

defendan~'s

not

AngZo-Oalifornia Trust 00. v. French Amencan Bank,

.108 Cal.App: 354 [291 P. 621]) and a ~ank may not;charge to
the account of its depositor a check paId on the hasls of such
an indorsement. (Hatton v. Holmes, 97 Cal. 208 [31 P.
1131] . Atwell v. Mercantile Trust 00., 95 Cal.App. 338 [272
:Po ·799].) Where the drawer intentional~y ~akes .a check
payable to a fictitious payee, he knows that It WIll be mdorsed
in the name of the payee by Someone bearing another n~m.e
and he thus cannot obtain the· benefit of these rules. SimIlarly, when he entrusts an employee with the responsibility
of signing his checks, the signer takes t~e place of the. drawer.
His signature creates the check and hiS knowledge bmds the

i·.
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drawer. [3] When the drawer or his signer is the victim
of the fraud of the bookkeepe.r who is charged with examining the drawer's accounts and informing him of his liabilities,
the person buying or paying the check has no right to a
release at the expense of the innocent drawer from the responsibility of determining the authenticity of the indorsements. (See Brannan's Negotiable Instruments (Beutel's
sixth ed. 1938) p. 223,224.)
[4] Hadley, not Ellis, was the signer of plaintiff's checks. Defendant, however, asserts that Hadley acted as a mere automaton, a,nd that Ellis's authorization was in effect an order
to him to execute the checks. While Hadley ordinarily signed
in reliance on vouchers executed by Ellis, the record shows
that he refused on at least one occasion to sign a check authorized by Ellis. In many large businesses, it is necessary
for the officer authorized to sign checks to do so in reliance
on the vouchers of another employee, although that employee
has no authority over him: In this situation, as in the execution of plaintiff's checks, the fraud of the employee preparing
the vouchers automatically leads to the, unwitting execution
by the signer of checks to fictitious payees. Since this severance of the function of investigating disbursements from that
of executing checks creates the only situation in which checks
can be commonly executed to a fictitious payee without the
knowledge of the person making them so payable (See Note,
74 A.L.R. 822), it is probable that the requirement of knowledge was included in the section to prevent such checks from
becoming payable to bearer. Thus, in Los Angeles Investment 00. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601 [182 P. 293,
5 A.L.R. 1193], one Emory, the manager of the insurance department of a real estate firm, prepared requisitions representing false insurance claims. He was not authorized to sign
checks. On the basis of his requisitions another officer signed
checks drawn to the order of various persons, and in their
n.ames Emory signed and negotiated them. It was held that
those checks were not payable to bearer, because the officer
signing them was the person making them payable to a ,fictitious payee, and he had no knowledge that the payee wa.s
fictitious. Defendant attempts to distinguish the Home Savings Bank case on the theory that the representations of the
defrauding employee were there subject to an independent
audit, so that they were not the direct cause of the execution
of the fictitious payee checks. The opinion, however, attaches
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no significance to this fact, declaring unequivocally that. fictitious payee checks are not payable to bearer unless th~ SIgnor
is aware of the fraud. Throughout the many years SInce }the
Negotiable mstruments Law was drafted, this interpretation
has been adopted almost universally throughout the country:
(See Brannan's Negotiable Instruments, supra, p. 208et seq.,
and the long list of cases there cited; 7 Am.Jur. 844; ~O C.f,.
580.) Since the same result was com~onl! reached In t~
country before the adoption of the Negotla~le Instruments
Law (see Kulp, The Fictitious Payee, 18· MICh.L.~v. 296,;
Note, 22 A.L.R. 1229) the decision in the Home SaVIngs Bank
case and similar cases may be supported on the theory that
section9(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law was inten.ded
to codify the common law. The question whether it was so:,nd
policy to adopt the rule is one for the .Legislature to deCIde.
Defendant relies particularly on Unwn Bank ~ Trust .00.
v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra, Goodyear Tire ~ Rubber
00. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal.App.2d 694 [37 P.2d 483],
and Rancho San Oarlos v. Bank of Italy, 123 CaLApp. 291
[11 P.2d 424]. The Union Bank & Trust C~. case involved
the fraud of one Williams, the director and aSSIstant secret~ry
of two corporations that maintained accouhts at the Umon
Bank. He was authorized by his employers to sign checks,
on which counter-signatures' were also required. He drew
and signed checks on his employers' accounts and procured
the necessary co-signatures. He presented these checks to the
Union Bank and upon a written requisition on behalf of his
employers, drawn and signed by himself, purchasEld cashier's
checks to the order of the payees designated in' the requisitions. He later indorsed the checks in the name of the, paye~
and deposited them. It was held thai the checks were. payable to bearer. ' The court emphasized the sPecial sit,uation
of a bank 'in issuing cashier's checks, a form ofcUirency for
which the bank is paid in advance. It is not concerned With
who the payee should be. For this reason the Jp1!>wledge of
the purchaser may determine whether a cashier's check to a
fictitious payee is payable to bearer. Williams, asauthori'Zed
by his employers, purchased. and designated the payee 'of th~
cashier's checks. The court also emphasized the fact tha~
Williams was authorized to sign his employers" checks. He
could therefore have drawn fictitious payee checks' agains~
his employers' ac'Count that would have been paya~le 'to bear~
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cr. The court concluded that the same result followed when
Williams used this authority to sign personal checks as the
means of causing the execution of cashier's checks to fictitious
payees.
In the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. case one Downs was
authorized to sign checks, which, however, were not valid until signed by certain co-signers. Downs drew and signed a
number of checks and his co-signers signed on the strength of
his signature. He then forged the indorsements of the payees
and collected the checks. The court pointed out that Downs
knew that the payee was fictitious when he drew and signed
these checks, and made it dear, that the requirement of cosigriers did not restrict the effect of his knowledge. Since the
joinder of the co-signers was automatic, the court treated the
case as if Downs we-re the sole signer, and concluded that the
checks were payable to bearer. The opinion, however, expressly asserts that if Downs had not been the signer of the
checks, his knowledge would not have been controlling.
In Rancho San Oarlos v. Bank of Italy, supra, an employee
was entrusted with signed blank checks and was authorized
to fill in the blanks. He completed them -in the names of
fictitious payees, .indorsed the checks in those names and then
negotiated them. It was held that they were payable to bearer. The court viewed the authority to complete a signed
blank check by filling in the name of the payee and the amount
payable as the equivalent of the authority to sign an otherwise complete check.
[5] Defendant in the present case contends that Ellis delivered the trust department checks because they were sent
to the payees by the accounting division. Delivery of a nego~
tiable instrument, however, is not essential to its execution.
A check is complete when received by the person who is to
delher it, and lack of delivery is no defense against a holder
in due course. (Civ. Code. § 3097.) [6] Ordinarily, therefore,
the signer remains the person making the completed check
payable to a fictitious payee regardless of whether another
employee is responsible for seeing that it reaches the payee.
(Los Angeles Investment 00. v. Home Savings Bank, supra;
United States Oold Storage 00. v. Oentral Mfg. Dist. Bank,
343 TIl. 503 [175 N.E. 825, 74 A.L.R. 811]; Seaboard Nat.
Bank v. Bank of America,193 N.Y. 26 [85 N.E. 829]; J ordan Marsh 00. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397

I
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[87 N.E. 740, 22 L.R.A. N.S., 250] i Oity of St. Paul v. Mer.
chants' Nat. Bank, 151 Minn. 485 [187 N.W. 516, 22 A.L.R.
1221].) A contrary conclusion has been arrived at when an
employee has discretion to decide when and whether checks
shall be delivered. (See Goodyear Tire & Rubber 00., v.
Wells Fargo Bank, supra, and cases there cited.) The sound·
ness of these decisions need not be considered, since the claim
that Ellis had such authority is based only on conjecture.
The evidence shows merely that the checks were returned to
the aecounting division to be forwarded to the payees. "
[7] After the checks were cleared they were, returned to
the trust department accounting d.ivision, which, was. ~nder
the supervision of Ellis, and there examined andbalance~
against the file of outstanding checks. Defendant concludeS
from these facts that Ellis was .the officer who, paid them,
and argues that in so paying them Ellis represented that ,he
knew of nothing wrong with the checks or their indorsements,
and accepted defendant's guarantee of the indorsements with·
out disclosing that they were-, forged. Defendant contends
that because Ellis performed these acts in the course of his
employment, plaintiff is estopped' from denJ"ing the validity
of the indorsements. The checks were not paid merely by
the settlement at the clearing house. This settlement is usually tentative only, and the cleared checks are not regarded
as paid until the time has passed under the clearing house
rules during which the drawee bank can return them to the
forwarding bank. (Sneider v~ Bank of Italy, 184 Cal. 595
[194 P. 1021, 12 A.L.R. 993].) It is difficult to regard any
one employee as paying the checks. If one were to be singled
out it would most likely be the employee who has authority
to decide whether or not the checks should be returned to
the forwarding bank. There is no showing that Ellis had such
authority.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
SHENK, J.-I dissent. In my opinion the judgment
should be reversed for the reasons stated by the District
Court of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, Division
Three, in an opinion prepared by Justice Hartley Shaw,
acting pro tempore, and concurred' in by the then Presiding
220.2d-e

,.

',.
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,
, I

Justice B. Rey Schauer and Justice Parker Wood. I am
satisfied that that opinion correctly interprets the statute
and case law of this state as applied to the facts and reaches
a conclusion which is consonant with reason and justice. I
.adopt it as a reflection of my views on the subject. It is as
follows:
"There are two defendants in this action, but, since the
defendant bank only is before us on this appeal, the word
'defendant' where hereinafter used, refers to it only, unless
otherwise indicated. The plaintiff issued certain checks
~rawn upon itself, which came to the defendant upon forged
mdorsements. The defendant impressed its clearing house
stamp upon these checks, presented them to plaintiff through
the clearing house and obtained payment. This stamp included the words, 'all prior endorsements guaranteed,' and
plaintiff brings this action to recover on that guaranty.
Judgment went for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
'(The checks in question were drawn and signed in plaintiff's trust department, and purported to be made for payments due from trusts held by it, to the order of a person
named L. W. Bobbitt. Plaintiff had in its trust department
several divisions, including an accounting division the head
of which was the other defe.ndant, Ellis, who haa'no official
title. All of these checks were false and fictitious checks
writte~ by Ellis, but not signed by him, he having n~
authorIty to sign checks for plaintiff, and none of them represented any actual payment due from plaintiff. After they
were signed Ellis obtained possession of them, indorsed the
name of L. W. Bobbitt upon them and deposited them in'
an account he had opened with defendant bank at one of
its Los Angeles branches, in the name of Bobbitt. Ellis
then drew the money out of defendant bank on checks to
which he signed Bobbitt's name, and used it hhnself. In
dealing with defendant bank Ellis did not pose as Bobbitt,
but as th~ latter's agent, making all of the signatures except
the first mdorsement before presenting them to the bank.
There was such a person as L. W. Bobbitt known to Ellis
but he did not live' in California, had nothing to do with
these acts of Ellis, knew nothing of them had no interest
in the checks, was not intended by Ellis t~ have either the
checks or the money procured on them, and did not in fact
receive either.
"The mode in which Ellis accomplished this defalcation is

described in much detail in the record, but a brief state.ment of it here will suffice. In its trust department plaintiff had an assistant trust officer named Hadley, who was
also an assistant secretary. He was referred to as a 'sign. ing officer' and his sole function was to sign checks and
other papers and documents coming from the trust department. He signed from 800 to .1500 of these various papers
a day, and of course had no time to investigate the various
transaCtions out of which they arose, to see if they were
proper, and was not expected to do so, but acted on the
assurances of others authorized to give them. When his
signature on a check was desired, the check~ fully' made out,
wa:s presented to him, . together with a 'debit ticket,' which
showed the name of the payee, the purpose foi'· which the
Gheck was drawn, its amount and the number of the trust
involved. At the bottom of it were also separate spaces
headed respectively hy the words 'Prepared by,' 'Authorizedby,"Signed by,' and 'Funds O. K.'In these spaces
initials or names of certain authorized persons were written
by them. When a check and one of these tickets was presented to Hadley his custom, as he testified to it, was to
look first to see if one of the authorized persons, of whom
he had a list, had signed under 'Authorized by,' and then
'to see if the "Funds O. K." was initialed by-a person having authority to so initial it; and then 1 examined the
amount set forth in the ticket, and turned it over and examined on the check to see if it was protectographed in that
amount; and then I initialed it under "Signed by" and
signed the check.' He did not look to see who the payee
of the check was or what was the purpose of the payment
or the name, purpose or number of the trust. It was physically impossible for him to do that work and the bank did
not expect him to do so. Hadley naturally had no recollection of the checks involved here, but Ellis testified that .
he presented them to Hadley and that in signing them
Hadley followed his custom as just stated. Ellis was one
of the persons authorized to sign debit tickets in the places
looked at by Hadley. Ellis personally wrote the checks in:
question and the debit tickets ·for them, initialed the latter
and presented the checks to Hadley.
"It is defendant's contention that under the circumstances
above stated, the checks in question were,payable to bearer,
within the intent of section 3090 of the Civil Code. If. this

:
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be so the checks could' be negotiated by mere delivery, no
indorsement being necessary for that purpose. (Civ. Code,
§ 3111.) Defendant's further contention that in such case
defendant wo...J.d incur no liability on its guaranty of indorsements appears to be conceded, ,and is correct. (Union
B. & T. 00. v. Security-First Nat. Bk. (1937), 8 Ca1.2d 303,
310 [65 P.2d 355].)
"Section 3090 of the Civil Code, so far as material here,
reads as follows: 'The instrument is payable to bearer. . . (3) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or
non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person .
making it so payable . . . ' There is no doubt that, if Ellis'
knowledge and intent are regarded as determinative, all the
checks in question were payable to the order of a fictitious
person, and this also, plaintiff concedes. While there was
such a person as Bobbitt, Ellis did not intend that he should
have any interest in the checlr.s and he had in fact no rights
in them. This is sufficient to make him a fictitious payee, if
Ellis was the person making the checks so payable, within
the meaning of section 3090. (Union B. & T. 00. v. Security-First Nat. Bk., supra.~ Of course, the character of the
payee in this respect was known to Ellis, but it was not
known to Hadley, who believed all checks signed by him to
be regular and genuine in all respects and had no information
to the contrary, nor was it known to any person connected
with plaintiff, other than Ellis. The question for decision on
section 3090 therefore resolves itself into these two questions:
Was Ellis the person making these checks 'so payable,' or if
not, was his knowledge on the subject chargeable to plaintiff?
"It is now settled that 'the person making it so payable,'
within the meaning of section 3090 above quoted, is not
always or necessarily the nominal maker of a check or other
negotiable instrument. (Union B. & T. 00. v. Security-First
Nat. Bk., supraj Goodyear Tire etc. 00. v. Wells Fargo Bank
(1934), 1 Cal..App.2d 694,702 [37 P.2d 483]; Rancho San
Oarlos v. Bank of Italy (1932), 123 Cal.App. 291, 295 [11
P.2d 424J.) In Union B. & T. Co. v. Security-First Nat. Bk.,
supra, the checks in question were cashier's checks of the
plaintiff, issued at the request of an agent of one of plaintiff's
depositors, made payable to persons named by him and delivered to him. He forged the payees' indorsements and obtained the money on the checks. It was held that regarding
the payees named in the checks the plaintiff had no intent

save that of following the agent's instructions and that since
his intent was that fictitious payees be named, the checks we~e
payable to bearer and plaintiff was not liable t~ the deposItor' for paying on forged indorsemen~. The ~aIthl.ess a,gent
was named Williams and the court saId on thl~ pom;: :rhe
intended ficitious payee was the creature of Willi~ms mmd,
and while the appellant Union Bank was the nommal maker
of the cashier's checks, still Williams was the~ person who
actually drew the bill and was the, person,ma~ng the cashier's checks payable to a fictit~ous p~yee; ~nd s~ce he acte~,
within the scope of his authOrIty, hlS act, mtent.and. kn.owledge,although adverse to and a fraud ,upon hIS, 'Prlll~lpa1,
are nevertheless binding upon the latter. (8 Ca1.2d 309.)
"In Union B. &T. 00. v. Security-First Nat~ Bk., 8upra,the
court cited with approval Rancho San Oarlo's. 'Y.' Bank 0/
Italy, supra, and Goodyear Tire etc. 00. v. W el~81!argO !lank,
supra. In the Rancho San Carlos case the plamtii!delive~ed
to an employee named Harris, who J;1~~ no authorIty to ~gn
its checks, several duly signed checkS on, defendant ba~k
which were· blank as to payees' names and ·~mounts. , T~l~
was done, according to custom, to enable HarrIS to pay plamtiff's bills. Harris filled out one of these checks for $10,000,
naming as payee a real person who. ha~ no interest. in it an~
was not intended by Harris to receIve It, forged this payee s
name and contrived to get the money. It was heldthl'!t
plaintiff, by delivering the blank checks to Harris, gave him
authority to fill the blanks, and further (at 123. Cal.App~
295): 'It has been held that the words "the person making
it so payable" refer to the person who actua1~~ drew the check
whether he be the nominal maker or not [CIting cases] i and
in principle the same rule should apply where the per~oIi
who actually makes the check payable is expressly or Im~
pliedly authorized to complete it in that manner.' For this.
reason it was. held that the check was payable to bearer,
under section 3090 of the Civil Code, and defendant bank
was not liable to plaintiff as for payment on a forged indorsement.
"In the Goodyear case, supra, the plaintiff sued to reco~er
money which it had deposited in defendant bank and whIchthe latter had paid out on duly signed checks of plaintiff.. The
plaintiff required two sign~tures o~ its checks, one o! the authorized persons, Downs, bemg also Its controller and m charge
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of its accounts. Downs wrote a number of checks to fictitious
payees, representing no obligations of the corporation, and presented each of them to a cosigner, with or without supporting
documents, sometimes signing it before and sometimes after the
cosigner did. The cosigners signed the checks without investigation, depending on'Downs and the system for assurance of
their correctness. Downs then stole the checks,forged the
payees' signatures and got the money they called for . It was
held that these checks were, in contemplation of law, payable
to bearer, and defendant was not liable to plaintiff on account
of the forged indorsements. The court discussed the matter
at great length and among other things said, at 1 Cal.App.
2d 709: 'On the facts of this case the cosigners of Downs
were mere automatons. Their names on the instruments gave
them no more validity than did the corporate name printed
thereon. They had just as much general intent with reference to the instruments involved as their corporate employer,
and no more. For all practical purposes their names as well
as that of the corporation might have been printed upon the
checks. It is difficult to understand why any insurmountable
legal barrier is created merely because on the facts in this
case cosigners were required to affix and went through the
motions of affixing their names at the time the che.cks were
in the process of being drawn. If the cosigners had signed
the checks in question in blank, then based upon every rule of
reason and on the clear authority of the San Carlos case,
supra, the checks were "bearer" checks. It would be no answer to say that authority to sign the blank was not given,
for the act of signing, would be within the scope of the authority of the cosigners. The facts in this case establish beyond cavil that the cosigners did, as a practical matter, sign
in blank.'
"Under the facts of the case at bar Hadley was in substantially the same situation as that given to the cosigners
of Downs in the case just quoted. Hadley did not even look
at the names of the payees on a check and either he had no
actual intent at all regarding them, or if he had any such
intent it was, at most, to make the checks payable to the persons intended by Ellis, and was thus like that of the bank
which issued the cashier's checks involved in Union B. &i T.
Co. v. Security-First Nat. Bk.,supra. There must be an intent
somewhere as to the payee to be named in a check and if the
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of the' check has none that intent m~s: .be. sough~ elsewhere; If the plaintiff should use a check wrltmg mach~e by
which signatures were mechanically placed on checks, WIthout
any attention to.the contents ofthechec~?y the;persons whose
signatures 'were thus placed on them, .1tlS ObVIOUS that such
persons would have no intent whatever m regard to such, check!'>
and the intent of those authorized to operat~ the machme, devoid of inteilt,and the intent whichdetermlile~ the ch~racte.r
of the check, on the question whether the payee s na~e l~ fict~
tious, must be that of the one who operated the machl~e, m thlS
.case, Ellis. As in the Goodyear case, s~pral the !sIgnatu,re,
though made after the payee's name was m the check, was as
a practical matter, in blank,' and hence is subject to the rule
of the San Carlos case, supt'a.
..'
.
"In opposition to this conclusion plamtIff CItes and rehes
on Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sav. Ban~ (~919), 180 Cal. .
601 [182 'P. 293, 5 A.L.R. 1193]. .The pl~mtIff there was a
corporation doing an extensive busmess, WIth several departments. One of these, in charge of one Emory, as ma:nag;r,
made many disbursements by check. Emory had no authorIty
to sign checks, and to obtain a check he prepared a demand
showing the. purpose of the payment and the person to wh~~
it was to be made. This demand was sent to the accountm",
department where it was examined a?,d if found correct a
check was prepared and presented WIth th~ demand to the
officers authorized to sign checks and the SIgned check was
. returned to Emory's department for delivery to the payee.
Emory, like Ellis in this case, prepared fictitious demands,
and oile real demand, in favor of named person~, some . of
whom. were fictitious and some real,. got possessIOn, of the
checks signed for these demands, indorsed the payees t;lames
on them and thereby obtained thfl money payable. o~ them.
The checks were drawn on defendant bank and plamtIff sued
to recover the amount paid on these forged mdorsements.
One of the defenses was that the checks were in law payable
to bearer, because of Emory's intent regarding them, but the
court said, at p.606; 'Emory did not execute the checks on
behalf of the company. It is the intention of the officers who
did that must be taken to be the intention of thecQmpan!.
The execution of the checks was one within the scope of the~r
authority, not within that of Emory. As to these o:ffic~r~, It
is plain that they did. not intend to execute checks to fictItIOUS
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parties or to pay money to the person to whom Emory intended it should be paid, to wit, himself. They intended to
pa.y mO.ney to what they believed to be existent persons, and
thIS bemg so, the checks 'cannot be considered as made to
fictit!ous payees.', This statement, while accurate enough as
appbed to the facts of that case, does not entirely conform
to the later decisions just reviewed, and some limitation must
be put upon it to bring it into such conformity. In that case
an audit was interposed between Emory, who prepared the
demands, and the officers who signed the checks the purpose
of which was to determine whether the checks w~re proper or
not. The signing officers were not mere automatons but acted
upon the results of such audit and it was quite proper to
regard them as having an intent regarding the checks~' But
where the actual signer of the check has and in the nature
of the operation can have, no intent at all as to the payee
as where he signs in ?lan~ (Rancho San Oarlos v, Bank' of
!taly, supra) or complIes wIth the request of another, with no
llltent except to do what is asked (Union B. &; T. 00. v. Securitu-~irst Nat. Bk., supra), or is a mere automaton signing without m:e~t (G.oodyear Tire etc. 00. v. Wells Fargo Bank, su1Jra )! It IS ObVIOUS that the character of the check cannot be de~ermmed on his nonexistent intent, and the controlling intent
IS that of the person who, within the scope of his authority,
fixes the name of the payee. In this case that persoil was F:aiis:
It ~lUstbe understood that oUr decision is based on the system
WhICh was so set up bY' plaintiff as to eliminate from the dut;
of .Hadley, .as the aetual signer of a check, any consideration
of ItS prpprlety, and particularly to relieve him from any neces~ity of even looking at the payee's name. If he had 'any duty
In these re~pects, butperfo~med it negligently or perfunctorily
or even omItted to perform It at all on some particular occasion
,
a different result might follow."
The judgment should be reversed.
Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May, 27,
1943: Shenk, J.,. ~nd Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. Schauer,
J., dId not partIcIpate therein.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE, KELLEY,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-C()mpetency-Evidence Wrongfully

Obtained.-Although the federal courts forbid' the introdu?tion of evidence illegally obtained from the, accused upon hIS
timely motion for its exclusion, the accepted rule in ,California
is to the contrary.
,
.'
[2] Id.-Evidence-CompetencY-Evidence WrongfullY ObtainedUnlawful Seizure.-The use of evidence obtained ,through an
illegal search and seizure does not constitute a ~eniaLof ~ue
process of law, since that does not affect the faIrness or Impartiality of the trial.
.
[3] Id.-Evidence-CompetencY-Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
-Telephone Calls.-Assuming that the Federal ,Communications Act of 1934, § 605 (48 State. 1064,1103; '47 U.S.C. ~05),
which declares that no person not authorj.zed, by the sender
shall intercept or divulge the contents ofcolIlID,ililications, ap:plies to evidence offered in a state, court;.suchetatute does .n~~
render inadmissible the testimony of pohce ,officers a~to telephone calls received by them in an ,ai>artinen~ .wh~ch' a~cllse4
occupied with equipment for the p~ose of recor4mg'~et.s,. aI"
the accused was not 1\ party to the mtercepted' commun~~a,tl0n'
, and hence was not a "sender" entitled to tlieprotection of ,tpe
statute.
[4] Gaming - Prosecutions - Appeal ~ :a;li.rmless and, :R,eyersi~l!l
Error.-In a prosecution for occttp.Ylng an apart~e~t Wlt.h
equipment for the purpos.e' of recordlli~ bets" assummg th~~~~t
was error to allow a pohce officer to Interpret ..,theterm , 1:r;tsured" in one of the telephone messages~hich ,he interce~ted;, .
and to testify that certain, places were race tracks'on. the 'd"y,
of defendant's arrest, such error ,was 'not prejudicial,wh':t~
themessages received by the officer, excluding the terms wlD.ili
he explained, were sufficient to support a verdi<it'o~ guilty. ',.
[5] Id.-Prosecution-Appeal-Harmless and :Reversible Err~
Hearsay EvidllDce.-In a prosecution for occupying an apa;rt...
ment with equipment for the purpose of recording bets; it' W'ILS

'.

[2] Evidence obtained by illegal search ,andseiiure; note, ~
A.L.R. 348. See, also, 8 Cal.Jur. 78; 20 Am.Jur. 352.
McK. Dig. References: ::1, 3] Criminal Law, § 409; [2] Crim"
inalLaw; § 410 j [4, 5] Gaming, § 24•.
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